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Abstract 
The paper compares the effects of real versus phantom stock option plans as different types of 
executive compensation on shareholder wealth. So far, literature presupposes that apart from 
tax effects both types of plans are equivalent from the shareholders’ point of view. This 
question is discussed based on a two-period model that includes a straightforward sequential 
moral hazard game in the first period after which the agent is remunerated via real vs. 
phantom stock options. 
It can be shown that if strictly positive abnormal earnings are expected in the second period, 
real stock option plans dominate phantom plans as the new shares provide the agent with an 
investment opportunity with a positive net present value. This becomes part of the agent’s 
remuneration and thus reduces the loss in wealth the original shareholders have to sustain by 
capital dilution compared to the implicit capital dilution induced by cash payments made 
under phantom stock option plans. 
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Effects of Real versus Phantom Stock Option Plans  
on Shareholder Wealth 
Overview 
  The following paper discusses if a firm’s shareholders who have decided on 
implementing a stock option plan as a means of executive compensation should be 
indifferent with regards to the implementation as a real versus a phantom stock option 
plan. 
  Based on a two-period model that includes a straightforward sequential moral hazard 
game in the first period we show that under certain conditions real stock option plans 
dominate phantom plans if strictly positive abnormal returns are expected in future 
periods. 
  This result sheds new light on the discussion of the reasons for the increasing use of real 
stock option plans as an executive compensation tool in the last years.  
  Additionally, the result supports the notion that once the present corporate governance 
problems with regards to balance sheet frauds and insufficient disclosure of stock option 
expense have been resolved, real stock option plans will remain an essential part of the 
executive compensation package. 
A Introduction 
The use of stock option plans as a share price-based executive compensation tool, which has 
gained widespread application in the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries since their 
inception in the 1920s, has been enjoying increasing popularity in Germany since 1996
1
 as 
well. Here, this development is due not only to the prevalence of value-based management 
concepts which unanimously recommend stock option plans as a means of executive 
compensation, but also to the elimination of several legal impediments to the emission of 
stock option plans through new corporate governance regulation (KonTraG) in 1998.  
Only very recently, the use of stock options as a remuneration tool has been subject to a 
certain decline. This has been due not only to several balance sheet fraud cases during the last 
years,
2
 but also to shareholders suspecting highly inflated management compensation with 
small or even zero incentive effects, and finally to the stock market crises since 2001 making 
any types of share price-based incentives less attractive. Nevertheless, stock option plans 
remain an essential part of the executive compensation package, together with base salaries, 
annual bonus plans and other long-term incentive plans
3
 and therefore are subject to economic 
discussion.  
Amongst the different research questions related to stock option plans, the following paper 
focuses on the question whether a firm’s shareholders are indifferent regarding the 
implementation of stock option plans as a real plan or as a so-called phantom plan. In the case 
of real plans, warrants are given out to a manager-employee, who exercises the respective 
options on the firm’s shares after a waiting period if the strike price is below the current share 
price. The manager may then either hold or sell the new shares according to his own 
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discretion. His economic benefit equals either zero (if the options are not exercised at all) or 
the difference between share price and strike price multiplied by the number of new shares 
that are called. In the case of phantom plans, no options and – more important – no new 
shares are issued. Instead, the manager receives stock appreciation rights. These entitle him to 
a cash payment reflecting the economic consequences of a real stock option plan, i.e. the 
conditional exercise of an option if the specific conditions are met and the underlying shares 
sold at the exercise date.  
The research question whether stock option plans should be implemented as real or 
phantom plans has been addressed mainly by German literature in an institutional context. 
Here, the implementation of stock option plans as phantom plans is recommended strongly, 
due (a) to insufficient accounting and disclosure regulation of real stock option plans inducing 
severe moral hazard problems if real stock option plans are implemented and (b) to German 
taxation legislation that actually favors phantom plans.
4
 Economic analyses that exclude both 
institutional effects as well as any additional behavioral aspects find that both real and 
phantom stock option plans are equivalent executive compensation tools.
5
 
In the following, we will look for conditions under which this equivalence does not hold. 
The discussion is based on a two-period model including a simple sequential agency game. In 
the first period, an investment project is chosen and implemented by a manager-agent. The 
project generates positive expected accounting rates of return during the first and second 
period. As the risk-free interest rate is set at zero, this implies positive expected abnormal 
earnings. In the second period, the manager’s input is not necessary any more for the 
generation of the returns. At the end of the second period, the firm is liquidated. 
The decision variable in this model is the choice of a real versus a phantom stock option 
plan as a means of executive compensation after the first period. The shareholders will choose 
in t = 0 whichever type maximizes at that time the expected liquidation share price. Note that 
the model does neither aim at determining the optimal amount of capital to be raised with 
respect to a given return structure, nor does it deal with question whether stock option plans 
are per se an efficient executive compensation tool. Instead, the focus of attention is put on 
the exogenously given ways of executive compensation represented by real versus phantom 
stock option plans and their respective effects on shareholder wealth. 
It will be shown that in the context of this model a real stock option plan leads to a higher 
expected liquidation share price and therefore to higher shareholder wealth compared to a 
phantom plan. The result holds even if the phantom plan is combined with a regular capital 
increase, but not if the real plan is serviced by a stock repurchase at the time of the stock 
options’ exercise. The intuition behind the dominance of real plans can be explained due to a 
so-called investment effect: The new shares given out to the manager if the real plan is 
serviced by a capital increase represent an investment opportunity with a positive net present 
value which may be exploited by the firm’s original shareholders during contract negotiation. 
These results are important for two reasons. First, they give additional insight into the 
dominance of real versus phantom stock option plans in Germany. For example, an analysis 
of 70 stock option plans of German companies in 1999 and 2000 shows that 66 are real stock 
option plans, none are phantom types and only four are combined types, i.e. the issuing 
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company may decide whether to serve the options by real shares or by an equivalent cash 
premium.
6
  
Second, the results also shed some light on the increasing relevance of stock option plans 
compared to cash-based annual bonus plans, as could be observed in the United States for the 
last thirty years.
7
 As a favorable tax treatment of stock option plans until the 1970s only 
serves as a weak explanation, the investment effect in particular may provide an empirically 
testable hypothesis on why (real) stock option plans continue to be used for management 
compensation purposes: if the expected marginal abnormal returns of future periods are 
sufficiently high, the investment effect makes real stock option plans a cheaper and therefore 
more attractive means of remuneration than cash-based payments from the shareholders’ point 
of view. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section B provides an overview on the literature 
relating to the topic discussed in this paper. Section C establishes the two-period model based 
on which section D compares real versus phantom stock option plans. In section E 
modifications of real and phantom plans are analyzed. The results are discussed in the 
concluding section F that also gives some caveats that have to be taken into account regarding 
the interpretation of our results. 
B Literature overview 
For several years now, stock option plans have been in the focus of economic discussion. The 
broad body of literature does not only deal with the question of stock option plans as an 
executive compensation tool per se, but also with related topics in finance, capital market 
research, accounting, or taxation. In the following overview, we will focus on those papers 
that bear a close relationship to the research question stated above. 
The papers of Knoll (1999) and Hanke/Poetzelberger (2000) both compare real vs. 
phantom stock option plans. Knoll shows that in a neoclassical setting both real and phantom 
stock option plans are equivalent from the shareholders’ point of view if tax effects are 
excluded from the discussion. Hanke/Poetzelberger replicate Knoll’s (1999) analysis and 
show that share price volatility caused by random share price movements affects the incentive 
effectiveness of both real and phantom stock option plans to the same extent. In the following 
paper we extend the setting used by Knoll and Hanke/Poetzelberger by assuming a second 
period after the stock option plan (either real or phantom type) has been exercised. 
As tax effects are one of the most apparent features determining the effectiveness of stock 
option plans as an executive compensation tool, several papers focus on this topic. In German 
literature, e.g. Wenger/Knoll (1999) or Winter (2000) point out that under the current German 
tax system, phantom plans are favorable compared to real stock option plans. This is because 
the payments resulting from phantom stock option plans are accounted for as personnel 
expenses and therefore reduce the firm’s taxable income, whereas this does not necessarily 
apply to the loss in wealth the firm’s original shareholders have to sustain as a result of capital 
dilution. Jasper/Wangler (1999) show that with regards to manager’s taxable income, 
differences between real and phantom stock option plans are irrelevant if the options can be 
duplicated on the capital market. 
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In the United States, tax effects are discussed mainly with regards to real stock option 
plans. Whereas Yermack (1995) assumes a strong empirical relevance of tax regulation on 
stock option plan design, Long (1992) points out that tax effects only partially explain the use 
of stock option plans as an executive compensation tool. In our analysis, tax effects are 
basically excluded from the analysis. However, in section F the results are evaluated with 
regards to the German tax system.  
With regards to the incentive-effectiveness of stock option plans, a body of literature 
discusses whether stock option plans are inferior compared to stock plans, i.e. if the manager 
has to invest in the firm’s shares instead of receiving simple warrants. The discussion starts 
with Haugen/Senbet’s (1981) seminal paper on the use of managerial stock options to resolve 
agency problems. Hemmer/Kim/Verrecchia (1999) prove that convex components such as 
stock options are introduced to an optimal managerial contract e.g. if the relative levels of 
managerial risk aversion are moderate.  
Wenger/Knoll (1999) point out that the effects of a stock plan on the manager’s welfare are 
difficult to establish as stock plans – in contrast to stock option plans - require an up-front 
investment whose relevance to the manager depends on his individual set of assets, his 
liquidity constraints and preferences, and/or his risk aversion. Kürsten (2001), on the other 
hand, shows that stock options do not necessarily provide managers with optimal incentives 
from a comprehensive stakeholder perspective. Feltham/Wu (2001) state that stock option 
plans dominate stock plans with regards to incentive purposes if the manager’s influence on 
the firm’s operating risk is rather high. In the following paper, we do not analyze the 
difference of stock plans versus stock option plans, focusing instead on the latter. 
Additionally, we assume that the manager is risk-neutral and that any costs and benefits 
resulting from transactions with stakeholders other than the shareholders are covered by the 
relevant market prices.  
Empirical studies analyzing the incentive-effectiveness of stock option plans in a moral 
hazard context derive divergent results. Brickley/Bhagat/Lease (1985) find that stock option 
plans are not necessarily superior to other long-term remuneration plans. 
Bizjak/Brickley/Coles (1993) observe that excessive concern over current stock price may 
motivate managers to use observable investment decisions to manipulate the market’s 
inferences about the firm. Bens/Nagar/Wong (2002) give evidence that stock option plans 
may motivate managers to share repurchases in an attempt to mitigate EPS dilution from 
stock option exercise rather than choose profitable investment effects. On the other hand, 
DeFusco/Zorn/Johnson find supporting (1990), but also rejecting (1991) empirical evidence 
for positive capital market reaction to the introduction of stock option plans. Morgan/Poulsen 
(2001) also observe that shareholders gain at the announcement of stock option plans. 
Jensen/Murphy (1990) state a performance puzzle, as the extent of performance-based 
payments, e.g. via stock option plans, is lower than predicted by traditional agency theory. 
Nonetheless, neither of these papers differentiates the results with regards to the 
implementation of real vs. phantom stock option plans. 
Finally, with reference to the setting of our model, which is based on a very simple two-action 
structure and assumes perfect Modigliani-Miller capital markets, a comparable model has 
been put forward by Pirchegger (2002) who focuses not on stock option plan design per se, 
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but rather on stock option repricing decisions in a moral hazard context. In this paper, stock 
option repricing is not introduced as an action variable as it is not in the focus of our 
analysis.
8
 
C The model 
In the following, we assume a two-period model. At the beginning of the first period (t = 0), a 
firm is established by a group of shareholders (principal) who contribute an exogenously 
given amount I of equity. A share is given out at the nominal value of 1, so that I also 
represents the initial number of shares. During the first period, the shareholders employ a 
manager-agent to invest this equity in a project P that has to be identified and implemented by 
the manager. Aside from P, the expected profit of the invested equity is zero, which also 
represents the risk-free rate of interest. As the model does not deal with questions relating to 
the firm’s capital structure, we exclude the procurement of debt.
9
  
The manager has a given reservation utility V = 0 and may choose between two effort 
levels: a high level of effort eH and a low level of effort eL. We assume the manager’s cost of 
effort to be c(eH) = cH   0 and c(eL) = cL = 0. If the manager supplies eH, a project P with an 
expected rate of return E[rt|eH] = t|eH > 0 with t = 1, 2 will be implemented;
10
 otherwise, the 
expected rates of return are zero, i.e. E[rt|eL] = t|eL = 0 with t = 1, 2.  
The rationale behind this output structure is the following. If the manager supplies only a 
low level of input, he will invest in an arbitrary project and the expected rate of return over all 
available projects equals zero. If, on the other hand, the manager chooses a high level of 
effort, he is able to identify a more profitable investment opportunity set that comprises a 
larger number projects with expected positive net present values.
11
 The average expected 
profits from this more profitable investment opportunity set are 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 and are both 
common knowledge. Exhibit 1 describes this output structure graphically.  
managerial
choice of effort
1 = 0 and 2 = 0
1 > 0 and 2 > 0eH
eL
 
Exhibit 1: Output structure of managerial effort 
Any expectations on positive abnormal returns during the second period result from time 
lag effects out of the project choice, resulting in unrecorded goodwill built up during the first 
period.
12
 For example, the manager’s project choice may increase the firm’s reputation during 
the second period, it may provide access to new markets or an additional set of investment 
opportunities, it may result in experience curve effects, or it may even help to keep potential 
competitors out of a market built up in period 1 so that the firm can reap monopoly rents in 
period 2.  
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With regards to the following analysis, some additional properties of the assumed rates of 
return are of importance. The rate of return is in all cases calculated as an accounting rate of 
return, i.e. the profit divided by the invested capital: rt = Gt/Ct-1 or expressed in expectancy 
values  t = t/Ct-1. The invested capital Ct-1 at the beginning of period t comprises the equity I 
together any additional capital deposits and retained profits or losses charged against equity. 
We furthermore assume that the expected abnormal profits vary with the capital invested at 
the beginning of the period, i.e. dt/dCt-1 > 0. This is especially important with regards to the 
second period and implies that the time lag effects resulting from the project choice and 
implementation in the first period can increasingly be exploited with the amount of invested 
capital C1 invested at the beginning of that period. Note that the model does not aim to 
determine the optimal level of C1 but rather focuses on identifying the effects of different 
types of executive compensation on shareholder wealth.  
Depending on the actual type of time lag effects, d2/dC1 itself may either be decreasing, 
increasing, or constant, i.e. the value of the second derivative may be negative, positive or 
zero. To make the following analysis straightforward, we assume that d
2
2/dC1
2
 = 0 so that  2 
is constant. However, the results become more pronounced in either direction if 
d
2
2/dC1
2
   0 and  2 is therefore either decreasing (d
2
2/dC1
2
 < 0) or increasing 
(d
2
2/dC1
2
 > 0) with the amount of capital invested. 
Regarding the contract design, we assume that the realized rate of return is supported by 
the same range of values in both cases eL and eH. In other words, the shareholders can observe 
whether a project has been chosen, but they are under asymmetric information on whether the 
manager has taken up the effort to identify a project from the more attractive investment 
opportunity set. It is therefore impossible for the shareholders to draw up an explicit contract 
enforcing eH on the manager: the observations regarding a given project (e.g. its expected or 
realized rates of return) do not allow a conclusion on the level of effort that has been chosen. 
Hence, a conditional remuneration scheme R() has to be specified that induces the manager 
to choose the high level of effort eH. 
We further assume that both the manager and the shareholders are risk-neutral. Risk-
neutrality implies not only that any dysfunctional incentive effects caused by inefficient risk 
sharing are excluded from our analysis. It also leaves the manager indifferent between risk-
free and risky income if the expected risky income equals the risk-free income. Therefore, the 
problem of financial hedging or restricting the manager’s access to capital markets need not 
be discussed. Furthermore, we do not have to make any risk adjustments to the risk-free 
interest rate for discounting purposes. Finally, risk-neutrality implies that the manager’s risk-
utility function is additively separable with respect to effort disutility and income: 
E[U] = E[R]-c(e). 
At the end of the first period, in t = 1, the profit G1 of the project P is realized. We assume 
that the investment I is fully amortized during the first period, so that G1 does not only reflect 
the profit from an accrual point of view but also from a cash-based type of accounting. G1 
therefore can also be interpreted as free cash flow generated during the first period.
13
 
Amortizing the investment I during the first period also implies that the project’s life cycle 
comprises only one period. Nevertheless, positive time lag effects may still remain at the end 
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of the first period if eH has been chosen, causing a positive expected accounting rate of return 
for the second period as well.  
After the remuneration has been paid to the manager in t = 1 according to the agreed-upon 
contract R, any remaining profit is kept as retained earnings or – in case of a loss – charged 
against equity.
14
  
During the second period, the manager’s input is no longer necessary. This may be the 
case, for instance, because it consists mainly in defining the firm’s strategic position by 
making the project choice. More formally, in the context of our two-period-model, we assume 
that the remaining activities consist only in closing down the firm and harvesting any results 
from time lag effects induced during the first period.
15
 As the original investment has fully 
been amortized during the first period, any expectations on abnormal profits  2 during the 
second period reflect not only the net income that is expected to show in the income statement 
but also that period’s free cash flow.  
At the end of the second period, in t = 2, a profit or loss G2 is realized. All remaining assets 
are divided among the existing shareholders in proportion to their respective shares and the 
firm is closed down. Exhibit 2 summarizes the model’s timeline. 
 Profit (or loss) G1
is realized and 
retained
 Stock options are
exercised if share
price is above strike
price
t = 1
 Profit (or loss) G2
is realized
 Remaining assets are
divided amongst all 
shareholders in pro-
portion to their res-
pective shares and
firm is closed down
t = 2
 Firm is established
 Contract offered to 
the manager
(stock option plan)
 Manager chooses
level of effort e
 Project P is chosen
and implemented
t = 0 time
 
Exhibit 2: The timeline of the model 
The original shareholders’ objective is to maximize the expected cash flow from their 
investment, which would be the liquidation share price minus the equity investment per share 
times the respective shares a shareholder possesses.  
Since the manager is employed only during the first period, the basic conditions for his 
remuneration scheme, which will determine the possible implementation as a real or phantom 
stock option plan, will have to be discussed only with respect to this period’s parameters.  
The manager will agree to the contract if, and only if, the expected remuneration E[R] at 
least equals his reservation utility plus his cost of effort, i.e. E[R]   V + c(e) (participation 
constraint). As the shareholder’s are under asymmetric information regarding the level of 
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effort actually chosen by the manager, the remuneration scheme R also must fulfill an 
incentive constraint, i.e. E[R] – c(eH)    E[R] – c(eL).  
Because of the manager being risk-neutral, the relevant features of R can easily be 
determined according to the standard results of agency theory: R has to be made contingent on 
the first period’s output and the expected remuneration does not exceed the cost of effort of 
the induced action, i.e. E[R] = c(e), so that in any case, the manager receives only his 
reservation utility V, which is set at zero. These results are implied by the typical “take-it-or-
leave-it”-structure of a straightforward sequential agency game: the principal offers a 
contract, the agent decides to accept or to reject, in the case of acceptance he chooses a level 
of effort and receives a remuneration based on the agreements made in the contract. 
As it is the objective of this paper to compare both real and phantom stock option plans, we 
assume that these are the only ways to implement a contingent contract resolving the existing 
moral hazard problem. We do not question whether stock option plans per se are an effective 
means for executive compensation. Nevertheless, the existence of time lag effects that are not 
accounted for in the firm’s books but only recognized as unrecorded goodwill, i.e. a 
difference between the shares’ market value and book value, is an argument in favor of share 
price-based compensation.  
Assuming that the managerial action choice is not a discrete but a continuous variable, any 
share price-based compensation that incorporates the time lag effects expressed by unrecorded 
goodwill (market value added) as early as the first period is a means to avoid under-
investment in goodwill if the contract may be specified only for one period. Cash-based or 
accrual-based compensation schemes that do not account for this goodwill, on the other hand, 
may lead to under-investment, i.e. an inefficient action choice by the manager.  
The stock options given out to the manager at the beginning of the first period may be 
exercised only at the end of the first period (t = 1, European type of stock option). The option 
character of the remuneration scheme also implies that the manager’s realized remuneration is 
R    0, i.e. R > 0 in the case of the option’s exercise and otherwise R = 0, so that the manager 
does not have to share any losses.  
Finally, we assume perfect Modigliani-Miller capital markets, which are characterized at 
least by a semi-strong form of information efficiency: share prices always represent the firm’s 
value, i.e. the sum of expected discounted dividends, which in our model equals the expected 
liquidation value because all profits are retained and the risk-free interest rate is zero. This 
simplifies the valuation of stock options in our model greatly as share prices are not subject to 
any additional randomness.
16
 Consequently, the only relevant feature for valuating the stock 
options is the expected share price at the exercise date compared to the predetermined strike 
price.  
In the following, we will compare the liquidation share price realized by the shareholders 
at the end of the second period under the existence of real versus phantom stock option plans. 
For the sake of the argument, we will start with the discussion of phantom stock option plans 
as a benchmark against which real stock option plans are compared.  
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D Results 
I. Phantom stock option plan 
If a phantom stock option plan is implemented with a fictitious strike price of 1. i.e. the 
nominal value of the shares before the contract has been made, the contract specifies that the 
manager is to receive   stock appreciation rights. If the share price at the end of the first 
period wP,1 > 1, each stock appreciation right entitles the manager to a cash payment of wP,1 –
 1, i.e. the difference between the share price in t = 1 and the fictitious strike price of 1. If, on 
the other hand, the share price wP,1   1, the manager will refrain from exercising the stock 
appreciation rights, i.e. his remuneration will be zero.  
As t|eL = 0 and t|eH > 0, the manager may expect the stock appreciation rights’ exercise 
and a remuneration E[R] = cH only if eH is chosen. Thus, both the participation and the 
incentive constraint are met. As soon as the contract between the original shareholders and the 
manager has been made and thus becomes known to the capital market, the observed share 
price changes from w0 = 1 to wP,0’ with 
2
1
'0, 1   with  )1( 





I
cI
w HP  
The change in share prices is due to the following effects: 
	 On the capital market, the type of stock option plan chosen by the original shareholders 
is observed. In the case of a phantom plan, the expected cash payments to the manager 
amounting to E[R] = cH in t = 1 is anticipated in the share price. 
	 It is also anticipated in the share price that the manager is induced to choose a high level 
of effort which leads to positive expected profits 
1 and 
2 (or positive expected 
accounting rates of return 1 and 2) in t = 1, 2. 
As the risk-free interest rate is zero so that neither amount has to be discounted, wP,0’ equals 
share price expected for t = 1. It also equals the liquidation share price that is expected in t = 0 
for the end of the second period and which represents the firm’s original shareholders 
decision variable. 
LPPPw ,1,'0,)2(    
To ensure that the manager may expect a remuneration E[R] = cH so that his expected gain out 
of the contract just equals his reservation utility V = 0, the number  > 0 of stock appreciation 
rights offered in the phantom stock option contract is calculated by the original shareholders 
via 
 
 
  212,
2,1
1
1,1,
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H
PPH
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As  > 0, the denominator reflects the feasibility condition for setting up the firm: the 
denominator – and therefore  – is a positive number only if the sum of expected profits 
exceeds the cost of high effort, i.e. 1 + P,2 > cH. Additionally, an expected loss 1 < 0 at the 
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end of the first period does not necessarily lead to an expected share price  P,1 < 1 if it is 
offset by a sufficient expected rate of return 2 expected to be realized during the second 
period. 
With regards to the stock appreciation rights’ exercise it can be shown that if in t = 1 the 
realized share price wP,1 is above the strike price of 1, the manager will always exercise the 
maximum number a =  of stock appreciation rights.
17
  
Lemma 1: The manager will exercise all stock appreciation rights if the share price is 
above the strike price of 1, otherwise he will exercise none of the stock 
appreciation rights allocated to him: If wP,1 > 1, then a = , otherwise 
a = 0.  
(Proof: see appendix) 
Based on the formula for R developed in the proof of lemma 1, the remuneration R the 
manager receives in t = 1 in case of the stock appreciation rights’ exercise can be calculated 
as  
 
 
H
HP
H
c
I
GIG
R
c
Ic
a
aI
GI
aR
211
211
2,1
12   s.t.)4(





	

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




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Formula (4) shows that R is also based on the expected return rate 2. If all expectations 
are met, i.e. if G1 = 1, the manager just receives his cost of high effort cH.  
II. Real stock option plan 
In the case of a real stock option plan, in t = 0 a contract of the following structure is 
implemented: in t = 1 the manager may call a number of up to  shares at a strike price of 1 
and keep or sell them at his own discretion. The manager will exercise this option only if the 
share price wR,1 > 1. Once again, this agreement guarantees that the manager participates and 
chooses the high level of effort eH at cost cH.  
The share price wR,0’ observed in t = 0 after the contract has been made and become public 
knowledge depends on the equity I invested by the original shareholders, the first period’s 
expected profit 
1, the expected number  of new shares issued in the case of the options’ 
exercise and the expected rate of return 2 in the second period. In analogy to the case of 
phantom plans, wR,0’ also equals the expected share price  R,1 in t = 1 as well as the expected 
liquidation share price  R,L. 
2
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As the manager once again just may expect gains E[R] – cH out of the contract amounting to 
his reservation utility V = 0 in case of the high effort choice, it can be shown that under the 
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given assumptions the number   of options issued under a real plan is strictly lower than the 
number  of options issued under a phantom plan. 
Lemma 2: The number   of stock options issued under a real plan is strictly lower 
than the number  of stock appreciation rights issued under a phantom 
plan, i.e.   < . 
(Proof: see appendix) 
With the expression given for   in the proof to lemma 2, the amount of   can be explicitly 
determined as  
 
   
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with E[G] representing the expectations in t = 0 on total gross profits after the necessary 
expected payment to the manager, i.e. E[G] = 2I + 1 – cH. 
As in the case of the phantom plan, it can be shown that the manager will always exercise 
all real stock options if the share price is above the strike price and otherwise none. 
Lemma 3: The manager will always exercise all real stock options if the share price is 
above the strike price of 1: if wR,1 > 1, then b =  , otherwise b = 0. 
(Proof: see appendix) 
Comparing the restated condition for the realized share price in t = 1 being above the strike 
price of 1, which is in the case of phantom plans I2/ > – G1 and in the case of real plans 
(I + b2/ > –G1
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, we can define an interval for G1 with 
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This indicates that if a loss in the interval described in formula (7) occurs, the manager will 
receive a positive remuneration in the case of a real plan but not in the case of a phantom 
plan. By reverting to t = 0 and replacing G1 and b by the respective expectancy values, the 
difference between the upper and lower bound of the interval is ﬁﬂ2/ﬃ. In other words, the 
feasibility condition for setting up the firm which is relevant for the original shareholders is 
relaxed up to an amount of ﬁﬂ2/ﬃ in the case of a real plan.
19
 
From Lemma 3 follows immediately the paper’s main result. The expected liquidation 
share price which is the firm’s original shareholders’ decision variable for implementing a 
real vs. phantom type of stock option plan, is strictly higher under a real stock option plan 
than under a phantom stock option plan. Exhibit 3 indicates the underlying question 
graphically. 
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w0=1
w0‘,P =  P,L
w0‘,R=  R,Lreal plan
phantom plan
Share price before the contract
between original shareholders
and manager has been established
Share price after the contract
between original shareholders
and manager has been established
~
 
Exhibit 3: Sequence of share prices before and after the contract  
Proposition 1: After the contract has been established between original shareholders and 
manager, the expected liquidation share price in case of a real stock option 
plan is strictly higher than the expected liquidation share price in the case 
of a phantom stock option plan, i.e. R,L > P,L. 
(Proof: see appendix) 
The main driver of this result is the expectation of a positive (abnormal) accounting rate of 
return 2 during the second period that provides the manager with an investment opportunity 
with a positive net present value if, and only if, he exercises his real stock options. The 
manager has no other access to such an investment opportunity, as the risk-free rate of interest 
is zero and if the manager buys the firm’s shares on the capital market he has to pay the 
shares’ market value which reduces the net present value of such an undertaking to zero as 
well 
.  
It is crucial to this result that the expected profit of the second period varies with the 
amount of capital invested, i.e. with the additional equity provided by the manager. It can 
easily be seen that if 2 = 0 or if d2/dC1 = 0, the liquidation share price is equal under real 
and phantom stock option plans and the shareholders are indifferent on which type of contract 
is to be implemented.
20
  
The economic intuition from proposition 1 becomes more clearly in corollary 1. It proves 
that the expected capital dilution under a real plan is strictly lower than the expected cash 
payment cH of a phantom plan.  
Corollary 1: The expected dilution of the original shareholders’ invested equity is lower 
than the manager’s cost cH of high effort, i.e. E[DR] < cH, with cH –
 E[DR] = 2.  
(Proof: see appendix) 
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As the expected cash payment cH to the manager reduces the share price under a phantom 
plan, cH is also called implicit capital dilution
21
. It describes the loss of wealth the firm’s 
shareholders have to undergo under a phantom plan, as the share price falls when the firm has 
to transfer some of its assets, i.e. cH, to the manager.  
The difference between the implicit dilution cH and the ‘real’ dilution E[DR] is  2, which 
is the expected return 2 on the amount   the manager has to pay for his new shares under the 
real stock option plan. The result of corollary 1 therefore can be interpreted as an investment 
effect
22
: Via the exercise of the real stock options, the manager gains access to an attractive 
investment opportunity with positive expected abnormal returns compared to the risk-free 
interest rate of zero to which he is subject regarding all other investments. This increases 
managerial wealth and is therefore exploited by the shareholders during the negotiation 
process where the manager is “beaten down” to his reservation utility. Therefore, the 
remaining capital dilution E[DR] the shareholders have to undergo under a real plan  is the 
difference between cH and the investment effect  2. 
E Extensions 
After having compared two basic structures of real and phantom stock option plans, the 
question is whether these results are also valid for modified stock option plan structures. 
I. Phantom stock option plan combined with a capital increase 
In some cases, phantom stock option plans are combined with a capital increase to make up 
for the loss of capital induced by the cash payment to the manager. In other words, new shares 
are offered on the capital market to finance the cash payment made to the manager. The 
question arising in this context is whether this might make a phantom stock option plan 
equally attractive to a real stock option plan.  
Discussing this point, it is first important to note that the effects of stock option plan design 
and (additional) capital increase have to be separated in the theoretical analysis. The reason is 
the following: The dominance of real plans shown in proposition 1 and corollary 1 is not due 
to the fact that the exercise of a real stock option plan leads to a de facto capital increase.  
Rather, the real stock option’s exercise transfers an investment opportunity with a positive 
net present value to the manager. The net present value can be determined by the number of 
stock options exercised   and the expected rate of return 2, i.e.  2. As this net present value 
represents additional value flowing to the manager, it is anticipated by the original 
shareholders (principal) during the contract negotiation (“take-it-or-leave-it”). The remaining 
expected wealth transferred from the original shareholders to the manager via capital dilution 
E[DR] is consequently reduced by exactly that amount  2 (corollary 1). Compared to a real 
plan, the original shareholders are worse off in a phantom plan, because they have to transfer 
the expected amount cH > E[DR] to the manager. 
Introducing a capital increase by offering new shares to outside investors at the beginning 
of the second period adds “fresh money” to the firm. If the capital increase is non-diluting (as 
we would expect from the Modigliani-Miller assumption), all profits from the capital increase 
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flow to the original shareholders. On the other hand, the new shareholders’ profit from the 
capital increase is zero, as the opportunity cost of other investments is represented by the risk-
free interest rate of zero. As can easily be seen, the original shareholder’s profit from the 
capital increase is independent of the loss cH – E[DR] made by choosing a phantom over a real 
stock option plan.  
If now a phantom plan is combined with a capital increase, the resulting profit to the 
original shareholders may at some point balance the loss E[DR] – cH  from the suboptimal 
contract design. But then, the comparison of a real plan without a capital increase and a 
phantom plan combined with a capital increase is not viable, as also the real plan can be 
combined with an additional capital increase of the same amount as the phantom plan. In 
other words: Combining a phantom plan with a capital increase makes the original 
shareholders under the given assumptions well off compared to a phantom plan without 
capital increase. Nevertheless, by combining a real plan with an additional capital increase, 
the original shareholders would be even better off. 
Consequently, only two comparisons are viable: real vs. phantom plans both without 
capital increase or real vs. phantom plans both with additional capital increase of the same 
amount. Stock option plan design on the one hand and the decision to make a capital increase 
on the other hand represent two different decision variables that must not be mixed.  
II. Real stock option plan combined with a stock repurchase 
Finally, we will analyze a modified type of real stock option plans in which the capital 
dilution effects are avoided by repurchasing the necessary number of shares on the stock 
market instead of issuing new shares to service the stock options. However, this way of 
structuring a real stock option plan is used only rarely.
23
  
As can readily be observed, the expected liquidation share price  RR,L under a real stock 
option plan combined with a stock repurchase equals the expected liquidation share price 
under a simple phantom plan,  P,L. 
Proposition 2: The expected liquidation share price  RR,L of a real stock option plan 
combined with a stock repurchase equals the liquidation share price of a 
phantom plan  P,L, i.e.  RR,L =  P,L. 
(Proof: see appendix) 
In the light of the investment effect discussed before, proposition 2 follows intuitively. The 
manager is still provided with an investment opportunity that has a positive net present value, 
so that the investment effect is still working. But in the case of a stock repurchase, this 
positive net present value has to be compensated to the selling shareholders as the repurchase 
transaction takes place at market prices.  
As a result, even though there is no capital dilution, the original shareholders’ economic 
position under a real stock option plan combined with a stock repurchase is equal to the 
position under a phantom plan, i.e. the original shareholders are worse off than under a real 
stock option plan in which new shares are issued to the manager.  
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F Discussion 
Summarizing the main result of our model we find that, in a setting of positive time lag 
effects beyond the stock option plan’s exercise period that can be exploited by using the 
invested capital to reap abnormal earnings, real stock option plans are superior to phantom 
stock option plans. This result holds if the phantom plan is combined with an additional 
capital increase, but not if the real plan is serviced by a stock repurchase.  
The economic reason behind these results is the following: if time lag effects occur, the 
share prices in t = 1 reflect the resulting expected abnormal earnings  2|eH > 0. The new 
shares given out under a real plan therefore represent an investment opportunity with a 
positive net present value, as the strike price is below the current share price. Providing the 
manager with such an investment opportunity forms part of his remuneration, so that the 
remaining capital dilution, which represents the cost the original shareholders have to carry, 
will be lower than the manager’s cost of effort cH.  
In the case of phantom plans however, the manager does not receive such an investment 
opportunity but only a cash payment whose expectancy value has to equal his cost of effort. 
Even if the manager buys new shares, he will have an investment with a net present value of 
only zero because he will have to pay the higher market price instead of the lower strike price 
under a real plan. The necessary expected transfer of wealth from the original shareholders to 
the manager is therefore higher under a phantom plan (cH) than under a real plan (E[DR]). The 
difference is the positive net present value of the manager’s investment opportunity ( 2). 
This investment effect is the reason presented in the context of our model why real stock 
option plans dominate phantom plans. It is a singular feature that can never be introduced into 
phantom plans, so the dominance of real versus phantom stock option plans still holds if a 
phantom plan is combined with a capital increase.  
On the other hand, if a real plan is serviced not by a capital increase but by a stock 
repurchase, the positive investment effect is set off by a disproportionate negative liquidity 
effect in the case of the stock repurchase. This is due to the fact that with the stock 
repurchase, the positive net present value investment opportunity provided to the manager has 
to be bought at current market prices from other shareholders. As the expected value of the 
manager’s remuneration is his cost of effort, the expected payment the firm has to make 
during the stock repurchase equals the expected cash payment induced by a phantom stock 
option plan. Therefore, the shareholders would be indifferent between a phantom plan and a 
real plan combined with a stock repurchase. 
Our economic results thus tend to support the empirical observations in which real stock 
option plans without stock repurchase plans prevail. However, the connection between our 
model and the economic reality has to be made very carefully not only because of the 
technical assumptions used in the model but also because several aspects that play an 
important role in the use of stock option plans have been excluded from our analysis. 
Starting with the latter, we assume, for example, equivalent moral hazard effects with both 
real and phantom plans. Nonetheless, excessive amounts of managerial remuneration have 
passed unobserved by the shareholders under several real plans mainly due to intrinsic value 
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accounting for stock option expense. Comprehensive managerial discretion is therefore 
supposed to be a much stronger explanation for the use of real stock option plans. On the 
other hand, if accounting regulation forces firms more clearly to disclose the value of options 
granted to management as well as the relevant characteristics of stock option plans, this 
discretion might be reduced.
24
 In that case, real stock option plans are still supposed to prevail 
if an investment effect can be expected. 
We have also excluded from our analysis several other empirical features of stock option 
plans that may swing the balance toward phantom plans. For example, under German 
regulation the manager may not sell the new shares obtained under a real plan immediately 
but only after a holding period. As such regulatory restrictions do not exist for cash premiums 
paid under a phantom plan, this may reduce the incentive effectiveness of real plans compared 
to phantom plans.  
Additionally, tax effects of real versus phantom plans have to be taken into account. 
Without providing an in-depth tax discussion under German law, we will sketch some of the 
relevant points in the following.  
With respect to the taxation of managerial income, German tax law is developing towards 
an equivalent taxation of income resulting from real vs. phantom stock option plans.
25
  
With regards to the original shareholders, however, the cash payments resulting under a 
phantom plan lead to tax-deductible personnel cost, whereas the capital dilution effects the 
shareholders have to bear under real plans cannot be made tax-deductible. However, this 
argument looses at least some of its power if the original shareholders are able to realize 
taxable speculative gains and losses with respect to the diluted share price, e.g. by selling the 
diluted shares at their lower price and therefore receiving a smaller taxable gain or higher 
taxable loss with respect to the shares’ acquisition cost. 
Moreover, as real plans are strictly preferable for the shareholders in a setting with positive 
time lag effects, the question is whether such tax effects are large enough to make up for the 
disproportionate cash premium. In more formal terms, the expected tax saving in the case of 
real plans must be higher than the expected reduction in capital dilution, i.e. c
 
s > 2 with s 
representing the applicable tax rate.  
Regarding the technical assumptions included in our model, we find that it is mainly the 
strictly sequential “take-it-or-leave-it” structure of the basic moral hazard game, which is 
crucial to the results because only in that case the manager is beaten down to his reservation 
utility during the negotiation process. If, on the other hand, some negotiation power is 
transferred from the firm’s original shareholders to the manager, the manager may himself 
reap part of the investment effect.  
Compared to the model’s structure, other technical assumptions are of only moderate 
relevance. This is the case e.g. with the agent being risk-neutral, as relaxing this assumption 
results in an expected remuneration E[R] > cH to be met, but with E[R] still being the same 
amount for both real versus phantom stock option plans: under both types of plans, the agent 
carries an identical amount of risk and is motivated to choose an identical level of effort, e.g. 
E[R] =  cH + risk premium. As can easily be seen, the argument no longer holds if the 
manager is risk averse and the specific firm risk, i.e. Var[2], changes with the amount of 
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capital invested. In that case, if the firm risk increases with a higher capital base, phantom 
stock option plans become more favorable and may at some point even prevail. On the other 
hand, if the specific risk decreases with a higher capital base, this would once again favor real 
stock option plans. 
Another technical assumption is the risk-free interest rate being zero. In the first place, this 
assumption keeps the model straightforward. As both real and phantom stock options imply 
similar return structures (per share investment of 1 in t = 0, liquidation share price in t = 2) in 
our comparison, discounting at a rate above zero will not change the results’ directions.
 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that an interest rate of zero in our model by no means 
implies that capital is not scarce. Instead, it is more plausible to assume that the number of 
projects that can be implemented is restricted compared to the available capital so that the 
interest rate is comparatively low (or negligible). Additionally, the model does not aim at all 
at determining the optimal amount of investment with regards to the original shareholders. 
Instead, the discussion focuses on the fact that the shareholders have to achieve an expected 
remuneration E[R] = cH if they want to induce eH and seek to do so at the lowest possible cost. 
Furthermore, we have assumed that the expected abnormal profits of the second period 
increase at a constant scale with the amount of capital invested at the beginning of the second 
period. This results in a positive expected rate of abnormal return, which is itself independent 
of the amount of capital invested. The effects of  2 varying with the amount of capital 
invested C1 depend on the type of variation. If, for example,  2 is strictly increasing, i.e. 
d 2/dC1 > 0, e.g. because the firm is becoming a more powerful market player due to 
additional investment opportunities or because the reduction of equity in the course of 
phantom stock option plans leads to increased cost of debt, real stock option plans are clearly 
favored. If, on the other hand,  2 is strictly decreasing, i.e. d 2/dC1 < 0, e.g. because the 
number of feasible projects is limited, the results tend to favor real plans only to a lesser 
degree. If the sign of d 2/dC1 is not determined,  2 also depends on growth barriers, and the 
results become ambiguous as well. Finally, in the light of the arguments presented above, it is 
quite plausible that if d2/dC1 = 0, that is if the amount of expected profit in the second period 
is independent of the invested capital, both real and phantom plans once again become 
equivalent executive compensation tools, because the marginal investment induced by the 
exercise of a real plan then has a net present value of zero. 
In addition to the detailed discussion of these assumptions, several other caveats finally 
have to be taken into account with respect to the evaluation of our results. To name some of 
them, the paper for one does not discuss whether stock option plans are per se an effective 
incentive instrument. Additionally, some capital market effects have not been considered. For 
example, real stock option plans may be beneficial from an information point of view if the 
employees’ exercise makes insider information public.
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Even though the caveats mentioned above indicate that the results of our model have to be 
translated into economic practice very carefully, we still feel that some conclusions can be 
made.  
First, the paper gives a tentative explanation of the prevalence of real stock option plans in 
economic practice. This might also help to understand the increasing growth rate of share-
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based (real type) payments compared to traditional annual bonus plans since the early 
eighties. As traditional bonus plans are in some respects quite similar to phantom plans, the 
long-term bull market structure that could be observed during the last decades has put 
increasing weight on the investment effect. 
Second, the paper adds an additional element to the comparison of real versus phantom 
plans, which until now focuses mainly on taxation issues. Instead, a comprehensive 
evaluation of both real and phantom stock option plans has to take into account the fact that 
the new shares provide the manager with an investment opportunity of positive present value. 
This investment effect is clearly in favor of real stock option plans, which implies that even 
under a tax system that favors stock appreciation rights from the original shareholders’ point 
of view, phantom plans cannot in general be considered superior.  
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1  In 1996, Deutsche Bank and Daimler-Benz were within the first German companies to implement incentive 
tools based on share prices via stock option plans. Escpecially on the Neuer Markt, the stock market segment 
for technology and growth companies, many firms followed. In 1999, the number of stock option plans 
implemented in German firms exceeded 100 (Löwe/Sieber, 2000, p. 50). 
2  E.g. Enron, Worldcom, Xerox, or – in Germany – Comroad. 
3  See Murphy (1999), p. 2487. 
4  See e.g. Wenger/Knoll (1999), p. 580. 
5  See Wenger/Knoll, (1999), p. 573. 
6  See Leuner/Rattler/Schmidt (2002), p. 23.  
7 See Hall (1999), p. 99, Murphy (1999), p. 2487. 
8  We suppose that the possibility to reprice stock options or stock appreciation rights affects both real and 
phantom plans to the same extent. Nevertheless, this is a field where future research might gain interesting 
additional insights.  
9  The latter restriction is not detrimental to our discussion as we assume a perfect (Modigliani-Miller) capital 
market. 
10  We assume that the returns are high enough to cover the shareholders’ expenses for employing the agent; 
otherwise they would not set up the firm at all. 
11  Note that still some of the projects in the profitable set may have zero or negative expected net present values 
so that the manager – even though he chooses a high level of effort – may be so unlucky as to choose a non-
profitable project. 
12  The goodwill is unrecorded because it is not reflected in the firm’s books. Even if an investment I with 
specific accounting rates of return  t > 0 is undertaken, the amount of equity in the firm’s balance sheets does 
not change, but only with realized profits. The only reflection of the unrecorded goodwill is found in the share 
price increase after the project has been undertaken. 
13  This assumption reflects the recommendation to align the waiting period for the stock options’ exercise with 
the strategic planning cycle time of the firm, see e.g. Lehner (1997), p. 33. In our model, the strategic planning 
cycle comprises the employment period of the manager which lasts from t = 0 to t = 1. 
14  This implies that with respect to the dividend policy we assume a Modigliani-Miller scenario of dividend 
irrelevance. 
15  As d2/dCt-1 > 0, this harvesting is assumed to be the more profitable the more capital remains in the firm. 
16 This simplification does not taint our results, as Hanke/Poetzelberger (2000) have shown that share price 
volatility caused by random share price movements affects the incentive effectiveness of both real and 
phantom stock option plans to the same extent. 
17 This is not necessarily intuitive, as the individual share price and therefore the managerial profit from each 
stock appreciation right decreases as the the number of stock appreciation rights exercised and the resulting 
cash outflow increases. 
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18  See the proofs for both lemma 1 and 3 in the appendix. 
19  2/ also implies that any expected loss in the first period can be covered by a high enough number of stock 
options if 2 > 0. Even though this effect does not get in the way of our basic argument, a feasibility condition 
should restrict the number of real stock options the manager may receive.  
20  In that case, the number   of options issued under a real plan is  = cHI/(1-cH) and equals the number  of 
stock appreciation rights issued under a phantom plan. 
21  See Knoll (1999), p. 7.  
22 The notion that a firm benefits from the additional cash inflow realized under real-type stock-based executive 
compensation plans has been described as liquidity effect Drukarczyk/Schwetzler (1990), p. 1778. As the 
driver of our results is not the additional liquidity brought into the firm, but rather the manager’s access to an 
attractive investment opportunity compared to the risk-free interest rate of zero, we feel that the designation as 
investment effect is more appropriate. 
23 For example, in a sample of 43 stock option plans implemented in Germany in September 1998, Winter 
(2000), p. 244, finds none that uses a real stock option plan combined with a stock repurchase 
24 Until today, neither in Germany nor under IAS explicit accounting regulations dealing with stock option plans 
exist, even though standard drafts (E-DRS 11, IASB discussion paper) contain ample disclosure rules as well 
as making fair value accounting of stock option expense mandatory. Under US-GAAP, SFAS 123 requires fair 
value accounting, but still allows alternatively the application of intrinsic value accounting under APB 25.  
25  See the Federal Fiscal Court’s decisions (BFH-Beschluesse) from VI B 116/99, I R 100/98 and I R 119/98. A 
detailed discussion of the recent developments is also given by Jacobs/Portner (2003). 
26  See, e.g., Huddart/Lang (2001).  
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Appendix 
List of variables 
  = number of stock appreciation rights offered to a manager under a phantom stock 
option plan 
a = number of stock appreciation rights exercised by the manager in t = 1 under a 
phantom stock option plan 
 = number of stock options offered to a manager under a real stock option plan 
b = number of stock options exercised by the manager in t = 1 under a real stock 
option plan 
c(e) = cost of effort incurred by the manager 
cH = cost of high effort eH, i.e. c(eH) 
cH = cost of low effort eL, i.e. c(eL) 
Ct-1 = amount of capital invested in t–1 
 = number of real stock options offered to a manager under a real stock option plan 
combined with a stock repurchase 
E[DR] = capital dilution expected by the original shareholders under a real stock option 
plan 
eH = high level of managerial effort  
eL = low level of managerial effort 
Gt = realized absolute accounting profit generated by project P in t 
I = amount of equity invested by the original shareholders in t = 0, equalling the 
number of shares given out to the original shareholders 
P = project chosen and implemented by the manager 
R = managerial remuneration  
s = applicable tax-rate 
t = time 
V = the manager’s reservation utility (set at zero) 
t = expected absolute accounting profit generated by project P in t 
P,2 = expected absolute accounting profit generated by project P in t = 2 under a 
phantom stock option plan
R,2 = expected absolute accounting profit generated by project P in t = 2 under a real 
stock option plan
t = expected accounting rate of return generated by project P in t 
 = 1 + 
2 
P,t = expected share price in t under a phantom stock option plan 
R,t = expected share price in t under a real stock option plan 
P,L = expected liquidation share price under a phantom stock option plan after the 
contract with the manager has been made and observed by the capital market 
R,L = expected liquidation share price under a real stock option plan after the contract 
with the manager has been made and observed by the capital market 
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 RR,L = expected liquidation share price under a real stock option plan combined with a 
stock repurchase after the contract with the manager has been made and 
observed by the capital market 
wP,t = observed share price in t under a phantom stock option plan 
wR,t = observed share price in t under a real stock option plan 
w0 = observed share price in t = 0 before a contract between shareholders and 
manager has been made with w0 = 1 
wP,0’ = observed share price in t = 0 under a phantom stock option plan after the contract 
with the manager has been made and observed by the capital market 
wR,0’ = observed share price in t = 0 under a real stock option plan after the contract 
with the manager has been made and observed by the capital market 
 
 
Proofs 
Lemma 1: The manager will exercise all stock appreciation rights if the share price is 
above the strike price of 1, otherwise he will exercise none of the stock 
appreciation rights allocated to him: If wP,1 > 1, then a = , otherwise 
a = 0.  
Proof: As any stock option plan is designed so that (a) the managerial remuneration is 
positive if and only if the share price is above the strike price and (b) the manager 
does not have to share any losses in case the share price does not exceed the strike 
price, we will only have to discuss that if wP,1 > 1, then a =  
 The realized share price wP,1 reflects an equilibrium in which the expected cash 
outflow resulting from the phantom stock option plan equals the realized cash 
outflow. Stock market participants easily anticipate the latter as all relevant 
parameters of the stock option plan and the managerial utility function are common 
knowledge. 
 Therefore, wP,1 > 1 implies that the realized managerial remuneration R cannot 
exceed I2/ + G1, as 
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 As any stock option plan implies that in case of the plan’s exercise the realized 
managerial remuneration R is positive, the left hand side of the last condition also 
has to be positive. Hence, from wP,1 > 1 it also follows that  
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 The amount of R depends on the number a of stock appreciation rights with 
0   a    exercised by the manager. Based on  
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 the managerial remuneration function R(a) is determined as  
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 The manager chooses a number a of stock appreciation rights to be exercised with 
a = arg max R(a). Having a closer look at the first order condition, i.e. 
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 we find that it is strictly positive, i.e. R is monotonously increasing in a, if I2/ > –
G1 which we have shown above to follow immediately from wP,1 > 1 as the basic 
condition for the stock appreciation rights’ exercise. Consequently, I2/ > –G1 is 
satisfied and the manager will maximize his remuneration by choosing the 
maximum number of stock appreciation rights a = . 
 q.e.d. 
Lemma 2: The number  of stock options issued under a real plan is strictly lower 
than the number  of stock appreciation rights issued under a phantom 
plan, i.e.  < . 
Proof:  As  depends on the manager’s cost cH of high effort, we have  
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 Introducing R,2 = (I + 1 + )2 as expected profit of the second period, we can 
restate this expression to 
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Comparing both 

 (see proof to lemma 1) and , we find that 
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 which follows immediately from  
 212,212, )()( &'()*(+&,)()*( HPR cII  
 Note that the difference between (R,2 and (P,2 is (cH + ,)&2, i.e. the difference in 
expected cash flows between real and phantom plans adjusted for the expected rate 
of return. 
q.e.d. 
Lemma 3: The manager will always exercise all real stock options if the share price is 
above the strike price of 1: if wR,1 > 1, then b = ,, otherwise b = 0. 
Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 1, we can restrict our analysis to a scenario of wR,1 > 1. 
 First, we can show that from wR,1 > 1 immediately follows 
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 The managerial remuneration function R(b) can be determined via  
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 The derivative of R with respect to b leads to the first order condition 
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 As the condition for the first order condition showing R to be monotonously 
increasing in b follows from wR,1 > 1, it also follows that the manager will in that 
case exercise all options allocated to him. 
 q.e.d. 
Proposition 1: After the contract has been established between original shareholders and 
manager, the expected liquidation share price in case of a real stock option 
plan is strictly higher than the expected liquidation share price in the case 
of a phantom stock option plan, i.e. R,L > P,L. 
Proof: Under both real and phantom plans, the manager’s expected remuneration has to 
equal his cost of effort cH. We therefore have 
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 As  > 

 according to lemma 3, it follows that  
 1,1, PR   
 As P,1 = P,L and R,1 = R,L proposition 1 holds. 
 q.e.d. 
Corollary 1: The expected dilution of the original shareholders’ invested equity is lower 
than the manager’s cost cH of high effort, i.e. E[DR] < cH, with cH –
 E[DR] = 2.  
Proof: Under a real plan, the expected loss of wealth a firm’s shareholders have to incur is 
represented by the expected amount of capital dilution E[DR], i.e. the expected share 
price in t = 1 without and with the real stock option plan’s exercise has to be 
compared. This yields  
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 Under a phantom plan, the expected loss of wealth to be incurred by the firm’s 
shareholders is the expected cash premium equaling cH to the manager.  
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 Calculating cH - E[DR] results in  
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 We further have cH =  R,1 – 1), which with R,1 = (I + 1 + R,2 +  /(I +  ) can be 
restated as 
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 Inserting this result in the restatement of cH - E[DR] leads to  
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 q.e.d. 
Proposition 2: The expected liquidation share price RR,L of a real stock option plan 
combined with a stock repurchase equals the liquidation share price of a 
phantom plan 
P,L, i.e. RR,L = P,L. 
Proof: To ensure an expected remuneration cH the maximum amount of options  the 
manager may call under real plan combined with a stock repurchase is determined 
via 
 )1( 1,  RRHc  
 The expected share price 
RR,1 at t = 1, which once again equals the expected 
liquidation share price 
RR,L, depends on the number of shares I that does not change 
with the stock option’s exercise as well as on the originally invested capital I, the 
expected profit of the first period 
1, and on the cash outflow from the stock 
repurchase in t = 1 which is 
RR,L minus the cash inflow  due to the strike price of 
1. 
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 q.e.d. 
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